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Book Review 
Whither the Conflict over Agricultural 
Biotechnology? 
GENES, TRADE, AND REGULATION: THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT 
IN FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY.  By Thomas Bernauer.  2003.  
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.  Pp. vi, 229. 
Reviewed by Charles R. McManis* 
If you take seriously recent admonitions that Americans 
(and their government) should devote a bit more attention over 
the next four years to listening to what Europeans have to say,1 
you would do well to read Genes, Trade, and Regulation: The 
Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology.  In this book, Thomas 
Bernauer, a professor of political science at the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology and a widely published author on 
international economic and environmental issues, offers a 
European perspective on the growing global regulatory 
polarization and trade conflicts that have engulfed the debate 
over agricultural biotechnology, or “agri-biotech.”  Professor 
Bernauer also explains how and why that regulatory 
polarization has developed, assesses the likelihood of escalation 
in the conflict, and concludes with some useful suggestions for 
policy reform that could help avoid the “seemingly unavoidable 
trajectory that leads from regulatory polarization to trade 
conflict to stagnation or decline of agri-biotech[]” (p. 3). 
Professor Bernauer is certainly correct that “an increasing 
gap is developing between agri-biotech promoting and agri-
biotech restricting countries, both in terms of approval and 
                                                          
 * Thomas and Karole Green Professor of Law and Director of the LLM 
Program in  Intellectual Property and Technology Law at Washington 
University in St. Louis School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Read My Ears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2005, at A27. 
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labeling regulation and at the market level” (p. 8).  As he notes, 
the hardcore promoters of agricultural biotechnology include 
the United States, Canada, and Argentina, while the opposition 
clusters around the European Union (p. 8).  Many other 
countries, particularly developing countries, find themselves 
caught in the middle of this increasingly fractious dispute (pp. 
8-9).  If you need a quick refresher on how the international 
controversy over agricultural biotechnology unfolded, Professor 
Bernauer does a very competent job in laying out the various 
challenges posed by agricultural biotechnology (ch. 2), the 
regulatory and market responses to it in a range of countries 
(ch. 3), as well as the interest group politics, or “bottom up” 
forces (ch. 4), and the “top-down” governmental interactions 
(ch. 5) that account for the severity of the regulatory 
polarization and trade conflicts that agricultural biotechnology 
has generated. 
As Bernauer correctly observes, differences between the 
European Union and the United States are at the heart of the 
conflict between agri-biotech promoting and agri-biotech 
restricting countries (p. 8).  He is also correct that this 
transatlantic conflict is likely to escalate in the near future (pp. 
13-15).  Indeed, a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute 
panel for a proceeding brought by the United States, Canada, 
and Argentina against the European Union over the latter’s de 
facto moratorium on the approval and marketing of biotech 
products estimates that it will issue the report to the parties by 
the end of June 2005.2 
At the heart of Professor Bernauer’s book are his 
predictions in Chapter 6 on the likely outcome of this WTO 
dispute and its probable consequences (pp. 118-67).  He argues 
that it is far from clear whether the United States will win this 
case as a legal matter, and even if it does, he believes it 
unlikely that the European Union will back down and change 
its regulations in line with American requests (p. 149).  Nor 
does he believe it likely that the European Union will acquiesce 
in any WTO approved punitive measures by the United States, 
as it did in an earlier WTO case involving a successful 
                                                          
 2. Communication of the Chairman of the Panel in European 
Communities, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/27, WT/DS292/21, WT/DS293/21 
(Nov. 2, 2004), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2005). 
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American challenge to a European Union ban on the 
importation of meat from farm animals treated with growth 
promotion hormones (pp. 149, 160-61).  Rather, he predicts a 
series of punitive measures and countermeasures if the ruling 
is adverse to the European Union (p. 149).  Indeed, Professor 
Bernauer believes that precisely because WTO rules do not 
provide clear-cut guidance on who is right or wrong in the case, 
and because political resistance on the part of the European 
Union is bound to be strong, the WTO is unlikely to invalidate 
the European Union’s regulations (pp. 149-61).  Nevertheless, 
he also believes that the United States may still opt for 
escalation (pp. 150, 161-65). 
These are dire-sounding predictions indeed.  But how likely 
are they to come to pass?  And, even if matters do unfold as 
Professor Bernauer predicts, are the consequences of an 
escalation of the dispute as dire as he makes them sound?  As 
American baseball icon Yogi Berra is famously rumored to have 
said, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the 
future.”3  Berra is also credited with saying, “You can observe a 
lot just by watching.”4  If the accuracy of Professor Bernauer’s 
predictions was all that was at stake, perhaps the most prudent 
course for both reviewer and reader of his book would be to 
withhold judgment until the report of the WTO dispute panel 
issues.  However, the urgency of the policy reforms that he lays 
out in Chapter 7 for avoiding a further escalation of this global 
controversy depends, not just on how accurately he has 
predicted the outcome in the current WTO dispute, but also on 
the severity of the consequences flowing from any resulting 
escalation of this or other trade disputes.  Thus, Professor 
Bernauer’s predictions are useful, if only to identify what these 
consequences might be. 
Professor Bernauer himself hedges a bit on his prediction 
as to the likely outcome in the WTO dispute, stating at one 
point that it appears “all but certain” that the United States 
would win the legal case (p. 155).  Bernauer bases his 
prediction on the outcome of three previous food safety cases 
resolved by the WTO dispute settlement procedure, each at 
least partially invalidating national regulations (p. 155).  
                                                          
 3. See, e.g., Humorous Quotes Attributed to Yogi Berra, at 
http://www.workinghumor.com/quotes/yogi_berra.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 
2005). 
 4. Id.  But in fairness to Berra, see id. (“I never said most of the things I 
said.”). 
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However, he quickly reverses field, arguing that the evidence in 
these three cases instead suggests that the United States 
would not prevail in its dispute with the European Union, at 
least in part because there is no formal moratorium in the 
European Union, but only a slowdown in approvals that is 
temporary (albeit now in its seventh year) (p. 155). 
More to the point, Professor Bernauer apparently embraces 
public choice theory to back his claim that the WTO is unlikely 
to rule against the European Union, arguing that both national 
and international courts “usually behave as strategic actors 
that attempt to strike a balance between legal consistency and 
political support” (p. 157).5  Indeed, he believes that the 
outcome of the growth hormone case, in which the European 
Union initially refused to make any concessions leading the 
United States to impose punitive measures on the order of $120 
million per year on European Union countries (p. 161),6 is 
likely to deter WTO decision-makers from ruling against the 
European Union in a comparable case (p. 161).  Yet as 
Professor Bernauer himself recognizes, public choice theory 
cuts two ways: while courts that rule too often and in costly 
ways against politically influential actors risk undermining 
their long-term viability, courts that bow too much to political 
pressure risk losing their legitimacy as independent and 
impartial arbitrators (p. 157).  Bernauer estimates that the 
non-compliance with an adverse WTO ruling will cost the 
                                                          
 5. Public choice theory, which is said to have originated with the 
publication of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s The Calculus of 
Consent: Logical Foundations of a Constitutional Democracy, applies the same 
principles that economists use to analyze people’s action in the marketplace to 
analyze people’s action in collective decision-making.  See Jane S. Shaw, 
Public Choice Theory, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, THE 
LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY, available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoiceTheory.html (last visited Feb. 
27, 2005). 
 6. Interestingly, however, on November 10, 2004, the European Union 
requested consultations, and on January 14, 2005, filed a request for 
establishment of a panel to examine the continued suspension of obligations in 
the hormones dispute, claiming to have removed the measure found 
inconsistent with its obligations, thus rendering the American suspension of 
obligations no longer justified.  The request states that the United States 
disagrees and denies that the new European Union measure is “based on 
science” or that it implements the Dispute Settlement Body’s 
recommendations and rulings.  See Requests for Consultations by the 
European Communities, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations 
in the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/1, WT/DS320/6 (Nov. 8, 2004), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005). 
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European Union something on the order of $300 million per 
year (p. 162), or slightly more than twice the yearly cost of non-
compliance with the growth hormone decision.  However, it is 
not obvious to this observer that this prospect alone will be 
enough to deter the WTO from ruling against the European 
Union, particularly now that the European Union claims 
(though not to the satisfaction of the United States) to have 
complied with the WTO mandate in the growth hormone case.7  
To the contrary, if the WTO dispute panel concludes that the 
two cases are indeed comparable, European Union reluctance 
to comply with the earlier order would seem to provide all the 
more reason for the WTO not to back down in this case. 
Nor do the probable consequences of an escalation of the 
dispute—irrespective of how the WTO rules—appear to this 
observer to be as dire as Professor Bernauer makes them out to 
be.  The punitive measures that he predicts if the European 
Union loses the WTO case turn out to be “imposing all sorts of 
economic costs on the United States in other areas, for 
example, in the form of escalating other trade disputes” (p. 
162).  However, because neither the European Union nor the 
United States has a particularly commendable record in taking 
its own international trade obligations seriously or complying 
speedily with WTO rulings,8 the escalation of these disputes 
through the formal dispute resolution mechanisms of the WTO 
would not necessarily be a bad thing.  Professor Bernauer also 
suggests that an adverse ruling might strengthen opposition in 
the European Union to further liberalization of agricultural 
trade, causing the current talks on this sensitive issue to 
                                                          
 7. See id. 
 8. For American non-compliance, see generally United States - Section 
110(5) of US Copyright Act, WT/DS160, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.  In February 
4, 1999, the European Community brought a complaint challenging the 1998 
Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998 as inconsistent with Article 30 of the 
WTO TRIPS Agreement.  See Request for Consultations by the European 
Communities and their Member States, WT/DS160/1 (Feb. 4, 1999), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.  On June 
15, 2000 the United States was given until July 27, 2001 to comply.  See 
Report of the Panel, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.  On 
November 9, 2001, the European Community was awarded $1.1 million for 
nullified or impaired benefits.  See Award of Arbitrators, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 
(Nov. 9, 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.  As of Feb. 
15, 2005, Section 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act, as amended in 1998, 
remains unchanged. 
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“almost certainly collapse” (p. 162).  But notwithstanding the 
deadlock at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference,9 caused 
in part by disagreements over liberalization of agricultural 
trade, that deadlock was subsequently broken on August 1, 
2004 with the announcement of the approval of a package of 
agreements, including a framework to be used to complete the 
“modalities” on agricultural liberalization.10  It is not clear to 
this observer that an adverse WTO decision in the United 
States-European Union agri-biotech dispute would endanger 
the July 2004 package, particularly as the liberalization of 
agricultural trade appears to be more important to developing 
countries than it is to the United States.  As Professor 
Bernauer himself recognizes, the European Union, like the 
United States, is busily seeking developing-country allies in the 
escalating global dispute over agricultural biotechnology (p. 
164). 
While Professor Bernauer does not specify what 
consequences, other than the possible escalation of other trade 
disputes, will flow from a WTO decision adverse to the United 
States, he does observe that the United States’s case against 
the European Union is apparently targeting not just the 
European Union agri-biotech regulations but all European 
environmental and consumer risk regulations based on the 
precautionary principle rather than on what the United States 
calls “sound science” (p. 167).  Certainly, this conclusion seems 
to be confirmed by the latest developments in the European 
Union-United States growth hormone dispute.  But whether or 
not the United States wins the agri-biotech case against the 
European Union, it will undoubtedly continue to pursue the 
growth hormone case.  Beyond pursuing this and other trade 
disputes through the WTO dispute settlement process, it is not 
clear what other means of “escalation” are available to the 
United States as a practical matter, short of abandoning the 
WTO framework altogether. 
Even if the consequences of possible escalation of this or 
other trade disputes are not as dire as Professor Bernauer 
                                                          
 9. See WORLD TRADE ORG., CANCUN DEADLOCK: SEPTEMBER 2003, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd22_cancun_e.htm 
(updated Dec. 1, 2004). 
 10. See WORLD TRADE ORG., THE JULY 2004 PACKAGE AND AUGUST 
DECISION, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd23_julypack_e.htm 
(updated Dec. 1, 2004). 
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implies, the policy reforms he lays out in Chapter 7 for avoiding 
a further escalation of the global controversy over agricultural 
biotechnology nevertheless bear careful examination.  He is 
certainly correct that regulatory polarization and trade conflict 
threaten the global prospects for agricultural biotechnology, 
due to possible exacerbation of domestic controversies involving 
the technology, fragmentation of markets, reduction of 
investment in the market, and stagnation of the market (p. 
168).  He is also probably correct that the reforms he proposes 
are a reasonable price to pay for long-term consumer confidence 
and investment in the technology (p. 173). 
The policy reforms Professor Bernauer proposes are of 
three sorts—1) strengthening national and supranational 
regulatory authorities; 2) promoting market-driven product 
differentiation; and 3) providing greater agri-biotech support 
for developing countries (pp. 174-84).  As for the first, he 
recommends the establishment of politically independent and 
science-oriented regulatory authorities with substantial 
regulatory powers along the lines of the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) (p. 174).  While he 
acknowledges that the FDA has been widely criticized for close 
industry ties, deficiencies in involving non-industry interest 
groups, and lax regulation of agricultural biotechnology based 
exclusively on the principle of substantial equivalence, he 
nevertheless believes that the FDA. can still serve as a role 
model for other countries.11 
Professor Bernauer believes that it is equally important 
that the government more actively support market-driven 
product differentiation, key elements of which are identity 
preservation and labeling (p. 175).  He makes a strong case for 
the proposition that voluntary negative labeling—that is, 
allowing producers, subject to certain constraints and quality 
controls, to label their products as free of genetically modified 
organisms—is not an adequate solution, as it would impose 
labeling costs exclusively on producers and consumers of non-
genetically engineered (GE) crops (p. 177).12  Instead, he 
                                                          
 11. For a discussion of proposed principles governing the assessment of 
environmental risks posed by agricultural technology, see Charles Benbrook, 
Principles Governing the Long-Run Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Agricultural 
Biotechnology, available at 
http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/Confpapers/benbrook.html (last visited Feb. 27, 
2005). 
 12. For a discussion of the current state of American law regarding 
labeling, see Neil D. Hamilton, Forced Feeding: Inventorying New Legal Issues 
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proposes that the cost of identity preservation and labeling be 
spread evenly, by developing three categories of products: 1) 
those containing no GE organisms (with tolerance levels close 
to zero percent); 2) those containing small amounts of GE 
organisms (with tolerance levels lower than one percent); and 
3) those containing GE organisms for specified purposes (p. 
178).  He concedes that this proposal will require substantial 
reforms in the United States and other countries with lax agri-
biotech regulations (p. 179),13 and that it might also exacerbate 
existing market concentration, as large United States 
producers and food processors would be better able to adapt to 
the new regulatory environment than would smaller United 
States-based processors and farmers, thus necessitating either 
stricter regulation of market concentration or government 
support for on-farm storage facilities and movement of grains 
directly to processors (p. 180).  Professor Bernauer also notes 
that market-driven product differentiation will thrive only if 
the products, product related research and development, and 
production processes are safe and GE products confer obvious 
benefits on consumers (p. 180). 
Finally, Professor Bernauer notes that increased 
investment in research and development and marketing of GE 
products that provide compelling benefits for developing 
countries would help increase public acceptance of the 
technology, which thus far has primarily benefited 
industrialized world agricultural producers, rather than 
promoting food security in the developing world (p. 182-83).  
Public-private research partnerships would contribute to 
alleviating concerns, particularly in the developing world, 
about “enclosure of the genetic commons” and dominance of the 
food supply by “gene giants” (p. 183).  Many developing 
countries will need financial and technical assistance from the 
industrialized world in establishing effective regulatory 
mechanisms; however, avoiding regulatory failures there and 
elsewhere is clearly in the long-term interest of the producers 
of GE products (p. 183). 
Professor Bernauer is certainly correct when he states that 
neither the proponents nor the opponents of agricultural 
biotechnology will likely embrace the implementation of his 
                                                          
in the Biotechnology Policy Debate, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y. (forthcoming 
2005), available at http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/Confpapers/hamilton.html 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005). 
 13. See id. 
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proposals with much enthusiasm, but he is also correct that 
this his proposals are probably the best that either can 
realistically hope for (p. 184).  Europeans would do well to heed 
his admonitions about the naivety of efforts to establish 
complex and costly regulations that are difficult to implement 
and increasingly divorced from scientific evidence of health and 
environmental risks (p. 184).  At the same time, Americans who 
take seriously the need to listen a bit more closely to what 
Europeans have to say over the next four years would do well to 
heed his admonition that it is equally naïve, and even 
dangerous, for the promoters of agricultural biotechnology “to 
assume that bullying agri-biotech critical countries into more 
permissive regulation, pouring millions of dollars into pro-agri-
biotech public relations campaigns and promising ever greater 
benefits and low risks of future GE products will resolve the 
current crisis” (p. 184). 
